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Foreword
Since the toppling of  presidents Hosni Mubarak and Zine el Abidine Ben Ali, 
people in Egypt and Tunisia are looking for the right path to a societal and politi-
cal rebirth. The current historic changes bear a distinct chance that these countries 
will make essential steps on a path that could lead to genuine democratization. But 
transformation processes are non-linear, they produce many irritations, frustra-
tions, and difficulties, and hence, societies in Tunisia and Egypt are confronted 
with numerous challenges and are engaged in a search process for answers to many 
complex, albeit decisive questions. For decades the two countries faced political 
stagnation. The whole system was dominated by one ruling party and a power-
ful president surrounded by an elitist entourage. Political life was characterized by 
many deficiencies: there were no free and fair elections, no clear separation of  pow-
ers, no independence of  the judiciary, limited freedom of  the press and the forma-
tion of  new political parties was suppressed. In addition to these grave political 
deficits (with a difference of  degree in Egypt and Tunisia) and the fact that follow-
ers of  the old regime are attempting to sabotage the transformation process, both 
countries face huge social and economic problems that will certainly increase the 
complexity of  the transitional phase. Socio-economic problems range from a large 
number of  people living in extreme poverty to unemployment, the lack of  decent 
social security and health schemes, and a very high level of  corruption and nepo-
tism. These pressing socio-economic issues need also to be addressed immediately 
with short- and long-term policies if  the transformation process is to bear fruit.
Historic shifts in Egypt and Tunisia are received in the West, including Germany 
and the EU, with very mixed feelings: on the one hand there is surprise followed 
by admiration at the power and courage of  the Egyptian and Tunisian people who 
defied the most brutal means of  repression and decided to speak up and fight 
for their most basic rights and for a regime change. They completed an essential 
step, namely the removal of  the despotic rulers and part of  their corrupt entou-
rage, in what the EU had been preaching for the past decade: democratization of  
Arab countries. The other side of  these developments is tremendous worry on 
the West’s part around its outcome, the new forces and actors it will produce, the 
degree to which genuine democratization will take place, the wave of  migration 
that swept over Europe, and implications of  all these developments for stability 
and security in the region and Europe. Self-doubts about EU’s and Germany’s 
politics and policies towards despotic Arab regimes are equally raised and a pro-
cess of  examination and reorientation is now in place. Whether this will result in 
more effective policies remains to be seen. The EU wants to and certainly should, 
Foreword
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given the high stakes of  happenings in its Southern neighborhood, play an active 
role as a partner—if  asked by the other side—in these transformations. Given the 
strong presence of  German development cooperation within the two countries, 
Germany equally shoulders a responsibility to assist and support. There is deep 
disappointment and a waning of  credibility, however, in the Arab street as a result 
of  Western countries’ double standard policy towards authoritarian governments 
in the region and their hesitation in supporting the revolutions right from the start.
Egypt and Tunisia are facing drastic changes and are confronted with challenges 
of  great magnitude, and the EU is reassessing and reorienting itself  to the new 
realities. Successfully coping with these developments is decisive for security and 
stability within these countries, within the region, and in Europe. It was precisely 
these political and economic deficits mentioned above that led to an escalation 
and an open conflict in the first place. The complexity and at the same time dis-
tinctiveness of  these developments require dialogue, debate, understanding, but 
also cooperation and mutual support. DGAP’s 15th International Summer School 
offered a platform for such a debate and for an exchange among young potential 
policy makers, addressing some of  the most crucial issues currently facing Egypt, 
Tunisia, and the EU. Twenty-eight young advanced students and recent graduates 
from Egypt, Tunisia, Morocco as well as Europe and Turkey came together for 
twelve days in Berlin to interact, debate, understand, learn, and to get connected. 
The specific aims of  the International Summer School 2011 were to offer a space 
for learning and for an exchange of  knowledge and experience related to the cur-
rent transformation processes as well as a sensitization for appropriate and effec-
tive policies and the development of  joint solutions. The Summer School equally 
allowed for an intercultural dialogue to increase understanding and trust between 
young potential policy makers from Arab countries, the EU and Turkey through 
an exchange about political and societal developments in the respective countries 
and a sensitization for interests and needs of  the different sides. Finally, it sup-
ported a pluralistic, tolerant and respectful debating environment and enabled par-
ticipants from various backgrounds to establish a network of  high caliber future 
actors.
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German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP)
The German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP) is Germany’s network for 
foreign policy. As an independent, non-partisan, and nonprofit membership orga-
nization, think tank, and publisher DGAP has been promoting public debate on 
foreign policy in Germany for over 50 years. More than 2.000 members—among 
them renowned representatives from politics, business, academia, and the me-
dia—as well as more than 70 companies and foundations support the work of  
DGAP. DGAP’s goals are to promote and contribute to foreign policy debates in 
Germany, to advise decision makers from politics, business, and civil society, and 
to inform the public on foreign policy questions and issues. DGAP comprises the 
think tank, the journal IP, the library and documentation center, and the platform 
Young DGAP.
• DGAP’s think tank works at the junction between politics, the economy, and 
academia. Its work is interdisciplinary, policy-oriented and covers different 
areas of  German foreign policy, which is dynamic due to a globalized and 
rapidly changing world. The work encompasses research and publications, 
high-profile conferences and meetings as well as programs for the advance-
ment of  Young Professionals. 
• The journal Internationale Politik (IP) appears in German as a bimonthly 
print magazine and in English as an online magazine on German and Eu-
ropean foreign policy. IP Journal offers German perspectives on important 
foreign affairs issues as well as in-depth analyses on central questions of  Ger-
man and European foreign policy by renowned authors and experts in and 
outside of  Germany.
• The DGAP Library and Documentation Center (BiDok) is one of  the oldest 
and most significant specialized libraries in Germany that is open to the pub-
lic. It holds substantial collections on German foreign and security policy.
• The Young DGAP is an initiative for members of  DGAP under the age of  
40. The Young DGAP aims at encouraging more young people to take an 
active interest in foreign and security policy through innovative events such as 
controversial debates and discussions with renowned decision-makers.
German Council on 
 Foreign Relations
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EU-Middle East Forum (EUMEF)
The EU-Middle East Forum (EUMEF) is one of  the core programs for the 
advancement of  young academics and professionals at the German Council on 
Foreign Relations. The forum conceptualizes and organizes dialogue and learning 
conferences, providing a platform for young experts from European and Middle 
Eastern states as well as Turkey to exchange ideas, to debate, to jointly develop so-
lutions to security challenges, to promote a better understanding and trust between 
participants with different backgrounds, and to build up a network of  high caliber 
future actors and decision makers. The underlying idea is that security challenges 
cannot be tackled by single nation states, but require international dialogue and 
cooperation. EUMEF is the follow-up project of  the International Forum on Stra-
tegic Thinking (2006–2010) and the Forum European Foreign and Security Policy 
(1997–2005) and focuses on countries in the Middle East and the EU. The EU-
Middle East Forum, as well as its predecessors, the International Forum on Stra-
tegic Thinking (IFST) and the Forum European Foreign and Security Policy, have 
been realized in close cooperation between DGAP and Robert Bosch Stiftung. 
1. Topics
EUMEF works on hard security issues such as inter-state conflicts and terrorism 
and on its soft dimension, addressing subjects like democratization, human rights, 
climate change, and migration. In 2011 and 2012, EUMEF will primarily look at 
chances and challenges associated with the current transformation processes in 
Egypt and Tunisia, and EU and German politics towards these developments.
2. Participants
During the pilot years 2011 and 2012, participants of  EUMEF’s different confer-
ence formats came from the North African countries Egypt, Tunisia and Morocco, 
from Turkey, and from Germany, France, Italy, Greece, Spain, and the United 
Kingdom. EUMEF targets students and young professionals from academia, poli-
tics, civil society, media and the corporate sector. Participants are recommended by 
a network of  experts available to the forum. 
3. Conference Formats
EUMEF organizes three consecutive but different conference formats. The three-
pronged approach enables EUMEF to bring together future leaders at different 
stages of  their career and to realize a sustainable network.
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International Summer School (ISS)
For two weeks in July, the ISS gathers 30 highly qualified students at the end of  
their studies or recent graduates (with 1–2 years of  work experience) in Berlin. 
The focus lies on studies related to the fields of  political science, economics, law, 
and media and communication. Besides lectures and speeches by international re-
nowned experts, discussions, working groups, and workshops on different aspects 
and angles of  an overall security related theme, open inter-cultural dialogue and 
social activities are part of  the program. This allows students to get to know each 
other and to reflect on differing perspectives and cultures.
New Faces Conference (NFC)
The NFC brings together 15–20 young experts between 27 and 35 years of  age 
for 3–4 days. Participants are young professionals from academia, politics, civil 
society, media, and the corporate sector. EUMEF organizes two NFCs per year (in 
autumn and spring), mainly in cooperation with different partner institutions in 
Turkey, Egypt, Morocco or Tunisia. Each NFC focuses on a specific sub-topic of  
the summer school’s main subject. The NFC provides a forum to discuss security 
issues with like-minded peers and senior experts. At the same time the conference 
enables participants to expand their network and to initiate joint projects. 
Alumni Conference
Biennially EUMEF invites all former ISS and NFC participants to reconvene in 
Berlin for three days. The Alumni Conference allows for a strengthening of  the 
network and an exchange among the alumni. Subjects addressed are derived from 
up-to-date security challenges and topics of  the former conferences and summer 
schools. Participants also get the chance to present initiatives and projects and to 
explore cooperation channels with other alumni. The last Alumni Conference took 
place in November 2012.
4. Objectives
• Reflection and analysis of  security challenges and the sensitization for effec-
tive solutions and policies on a national and EU level 
• Exchange of  know-how and experiences 
• Promotion of  an intercultural dialogue to increase understanding and trust 
between young potential policy makers from Arab countries, the EU, and 
Turkey 
• Promotion of  a pluralistic, tolerant, and respectful debating environment 
• Establishing a network of  high caliber future actors from North Africa, the 
EU, and Turkey.
The DGAP International 
Summer School
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Agenda
Monday, 11 July
09:00–09:30 Opening of  the 15th International Summer School
Prof. Dr. Eberhard Sandschneider, Otto Wolff-Director 
of  the Research Institute, DGAP
Stella Voutta, Program Officer, International Relations 
Western Europe, America, Turkey, Japan, India, Robert 
Bosch Stiftung
Bernd Asbach, Head of  Middle East Department, 
Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung—The Green Political Foundation 
10:00–11:00 Getting to know DGAP—The Role of  a German 
Think Tank
Prof. Dr. Eberhard Sandschneider, Otto Wolff-Director 
of  the Research Institute, DGAP
11:30–13:00 Between Transformation and Democracy—Some 
Conceptual Remarks
Prof. Dr. Cilja Harders, Head of  the Center for Middle 
Eastern and North African Studies, Freie Universität 
Berlin, Germany
13:00–14:00 Lunch at DGAP
14:00–15:00 Introduction and Instructions to the Working 
Groups
Dina Fakoussa, Head of  Program, EU-Middle East 
Forum
Christian Achrainer, Program Officer, EU-Middle East 
Forum
15:00–19:00 “Scavenger Hunt” through Berlin
19:00 Dinner at DGAP
Agenda
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Tuesday, 12 July
09:00–10:30 Presentation of  Scavenger Hunt Results
11:00–12:30 Between Human Development, Human Security, 
and National Security
Sascha Werthes, Associate Fellow at the Institute for De-
velopment and Peace (INEF) and Lecturer at the Faculty 
of  Social Science at the University of  Duisburg-Essen, 
Germany
12:30–13:15 Lunch at DGAP
13:15–18:30 Debating Workshop
Dominic Hildebrand, Clemens Lechner, and Philipp 
Stiehl (Streitkultur e. V.)
18:30–19:30 Dinner at DGAP
20:00–21:30 Panel Debate (organized together with Streitkultur 
Berlin e. V.): Should the West use Military Force to 
remove Despotic Regimes?
Agenda
Heba from Egypt is posing a question during the panel debate
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Wednesday, 13 July
09:00–10:30 Institutionalization of  Movements and the Forma-
tion of  New Political Parties—How to become 
 Viable Forces
Prof. Dr. Mustapha Kamel Al-Sayyid, Professor for Po-
litical Science at Cairo University and Executive Director 
of  Partners-in-Development for Research, Consulting 
and Training, Cairo, Egypt
11:00–12:30 Transitional Justice in Post-Authoritarian Settings
Teresa Koloma Beck, PhD, Research Associate at the 
Center for Conflict Studies, Philipps University Marburg, 
Germany
12:30–13:30 Lunch at DGAP
15:00–18:00	 Visit	to	the	Office	of 	the	Federal	Commissioner	for	
preserving the records of  the Ministry for State Secu-
rity of  the GDR (BStU)
Dealing with the State Security of  Despotic Re-
gimes—Germany’s Experience with the STASI and 
Lessons Learned for Egypt and Tunisia
Joachim Förster, Head of  Department AU (Auskunft/
Verwendung von Unterlagen) of  the BStU
Agenda
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Thursday, 14 July
09:00–10:30 Socio-Economic Malaise as a Security Threat—
Which Reforms for North Africa?
Dr. Markus Loewe, Senior Economist at Department 
II: Competitiveness and Social Development, German 
Development Institute (die), Bonn, Germany
11:00–13:30 Working Group Session
13:30–14:30 Lunch at DGAP
14:30–16:00 Development and Agenda of  Islamist Forces in Tu-
nisia and Egypt—Implications for the Democratiza-
tion Process
Prof. Dr. Fawaz Gerges, Director of  the Middle East 
Centre at the London School of  Economics and Political 
Science (LSE), UK
16:30–18:00 Sustainability of  Processes—Evolution as a Guide
Frederik Fleischmann, Consultant at Evoco GmbH, 
Berlin, Germany
18:00 Dinner at DGAP
Agenda
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Agenda
Friday, 15 July
09:30–11:15 Visit to the Federal Ministry of  Defence
The Role of  the Military in a Democratic System 
and Ongoing Operations of  the German Armed 
Forces
Major General Karl Müllner, ACOS Politico-Military 
Affairs and Arms Control, Federal Ministry of  Defence, 
Berlin, Germany
11:15–12:30  Reception and Lunch at the Ministry of  Defence
14:00–15:30 Visit to infra test dimap
Electoral and Political Research in Democratic Sys-
tems—Role, Methods and Instruments
Jürgen Hofrichter, Head of  Election Research
The participants in front of Infratest dimap
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Sunday, 17 July
15:30–17:00 Visit to the Reichstag, Seat of  the German 
Parliament
Monday, 18 July
09:00–10:30 Democratization and Security in Central and Eastern 
Europe—Same but Different
Dr. Janusz Onyszkiewicz, Former Polish Minister of  De-
fense and Chairman of  the Council of  the Euro-Atlantic 
Association, Warsaw, Poland
11:00–12:30 Transition in Indonesia—A Crisis of  Democratic 
Governance?
PD Dr. Andreas Ufen, Research Fellow at the GIGA 
Institute of  Asian Studies, Hamburg, Germany
12:30–13:30 Lunch at DGAP
13:30–16:00 Working Group Session
16:30–17:30  Debate 1: Neoliberalism fails to achieve Social 
Justice.
Working Group 1 vs. Working Group 2
17:30–18:30	 Debate	2:	Party	Officials	of 	Former	Autocratic	
Regimes should be barred from Political Life 
altogether.
Working Group 3 vs. Working Group 4
18:30 Dinner at DGAP
Agenda
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Tuesday, 19 July 
09:00–10:30 The EU Neighborhood Policy—Critical Review and 
the Way Forward
Almut Möller, Head of  the Alfred von Oppenheim-Cen-
ter for European Policy Studies, DGAP
11:00–12:30 Germany’s Development Cooperation with North 
Africa—Lessons Learnt and New Approaches?
Laura Fuesers, Policy Planning Staff, Ministry of  Eco-
nomic Cooperation and Development (BMZ)
Henriette Sachse, Desk Officer for Syria, Jordan, Iraq at 
the Near and Middle East Division, Ministry of  Eco-
nomic Cooperation and Development (BMZ)
12:30–13:30 Lunch at DGAP
13:30–16:00 Working Group Session
17:00–18:30 Visit to taz.die tageszeitung
The Media in Transformation Processes—Con-
structivism	and	Conflict	Sensitivity
Beate Seel, Head of  the Department International 
 Affairs, taz
Agenda
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Wednesday, 20 July 
09:00–10:30 Potentials and Limits of  Turkey as a Partner in the 
Arab Region
Prof. Dr. Hüseyin Bağcı, Chairman of  the Department 
of  International Relations at the Middle East Technical 
University, Ankara, Turkey
11:00–13:00 Working Group Session
13:00–14:00 Lunch at DGAP
14:00–16:00 Working Group Session
16:30–18:00 Developments in Syria—Implications Nationally, 
Regionally, and Internationally
Dr. Muriel Asseburg, Head of  Research Division “Mid-
dle East and Africa,” German Institute for International 
and Security Affairs (SWP), Berlin, Germany
18:00 Dinner at DGAP
Agenda
Discussions in small working groups are an important part of the Summer School
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Thursday, 21 July
09:00–11:00 Working Group Session
11:30–12:30 Debate 1: Should the Military in Post-Authoritarian 
Settings have Constitutional Authority to safeguard 
the Values and Principles of  the State?
Working Group 1 vs. Working Group 2
12:30–13:30 Debate 2: Should the EU recognize the Legitimate 
Election of  Political Forces who do not subscribe to 
Liberal, Secular Values?
Working Group 3 vs. Working Group 4
13:30–14:30 Lunch at DGAP
14:30–15:30 Debate 3: Only a Secular State can be a Democratic 
State.
Winner Debate 1 vs. Winner Debate 2
19:30 Dinner & Farewell Party
Agenda
Umberto from Italy is arguing passionately
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List of Participants
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Lectures, Panels and 
Presentations
Lectures at DGAP
The following pages provide a summary of  each speaker’s contribution in the or-
der of  their appearance at DGAP’s International Summer School. Summaries of  
presentations held during visits to other political institutions can be found in the 
following chapter (p. 56).
Prof. Dr. Cilija Harders: “Between Transformation and Democracy—A 
Spotlight on Egypt”
Prof. Dr. Cilja Harders, Head of  the Center for Middle Eastern and North Afri-
can Studies at the Freie Universität Berlin, opened the 15th International Summer 
School with her lecture. Ms Harders stressed how important and inspiring it is to 
be with young people in these times, to listen to them and their own impressions 
as they are the ones who shape and thrive on change. While lecturing, she pro-
vided the participants ample opportunity to introduce their own ideas and experi-
ences and exchange their opinions with her and each other.
Ms Harders began with some remarks about the protests’ characteristics. She 
highlighted significant differences among the countries and the circumstances un-
der which the protests had taken place. At the same time she criticized that these 
differences were often neglected by German and other “Western” media, who 
instead portrayed the protests in a very culturalist, homogenized manner. Elabo-
rating on the role of  “new media,” Ms Harders emphasized that the revolutions 
in Tunisia and Egypt are in her opinion no “Facebook Revolutions.” She admitted 
that new social media networks like Facebook and Twitter have reduced opportu-
nity costs for the protesters by vastly facilitating information flows and thus stimu-
lating popular participation. The regimes also used them for their own purposes: 
in Egypt, for example, the mobile networks were shut down for three days and 
still the demonstrations continued, simply because word of  mouth continues to be 
the most effective means of  communication. Additionally, the “new media” are a 
potential threat to the protests as they also provide means of  generating informa-
tion about protests that can be turned against the protestors. Nevertheless, both 
Internet and Satellite TV—most visible Al Jazeera—have been important in terms 
of  mobilization, as they have politicized a structural crisis and have influenced 
the “political culture” over the long run. Ms Harders also shared her view with the 
participants that the protests were also partly directed against authoritarian and pa-
ternalistic structures in families, against current gender relations etc., and that this 
social rebellion has also been triggered and influenced by the media. In addition 
to the media, protest experience gained by many people in Tunisia and Egypt over 
the last decade has been of  great importance for the current protests. Both the 
21
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Kefaya movement and the independent labour movement in Egypt and the trade 
unions’ protest in Tunisia provided valuable protest experience.
After these remarks about some of  the protests’ characteristics Ms Harders re-
ferred to the aftermath of  the protests and the current feelings of  hope, not ignor-
ing, however, the insecurity and anxiousness felt about the political future of  the 
countries. She anticipated that it might be necessary to protest continually and to 
put pressure on the people in power over and over again. Even though this might 
be very exhausting, she stated that the ongoing practice of  protests is exactly the 
experience a democracy needs: a democracy survives only through living it out. 
Importantly, these experiences would generate and reinforce a feeling of  citizen-
ship and ownership amongst the people. Subsequently Ms Harders discussed some 
of  the root causes of  the protests together with the participants. They agreed 
that the central cause has been a crisis of  legitimacy due to a political, economic 
and social crisis, which has been caused by a “transformation without transition.” 
The participants offered insights into their own experiences, discussed the role 
of  media in general and of  Al Jazeera in different countries in particular. Also the 
definition of  a “revolution” and the question why the protests had begun at this 
specific point of  time were addressed.
Ms Harders continued her lecture by providing the participants with theoretical 
background to facilitate an analytical examination of  the revolution in both coun-
Prof. Cilija Harders during her intervention
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tries. She listed some dimensions of  analysis: the relationship between poverty and 
wealth especially concerning the feeling of  injustice and deprivation, the regime 
type, the intensity of  social movements and mobilization as well as the political 
culture, access to media, the power and position of  the army, the position of  mili-
tia and historical experiences with democracy and war, social, ethnic and religious 
cleavages and the international context (intervention, colonialization, regional 
conflicts).
She pointed out that different theoretical approaches are necessary in order to un-
derstand processes of  transformation. For example political regime analysis alone 
has not been able to grasp and understand the current events, however social 
movement theory offers helpful insights in this regard. Being asked for “condi-
tions for a successful transformation” Ms Harders argued that these processes are 
complex and that the discussion about preconditions does not lead very far. There 
are no “stages” to democracy. As modernization theory for example claims, sound 
economic conditions can be very important, they, however, do not necessarily re-
sult in a successful transformation. Many factors and conditions play a role. Elabo-
rating on the old system of  Arab authoritarian republics Ms Harders emphasized 
that besides the strategy of  repression there had been other adaption strategies 
used by the regimes to hold on to power, like informalization, islamization, liber-
alization and cooptation, resulting in a social contract of  informality. Ms Harders 
argued that repression is a very important strategy but it is not enough to suppress 
people and to eliminate opposition. Based on this argument she expressed hope 
that Bashar al-Assad in Syria and Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in Iran would not be 
able to hold on to power forever.
Sascha Werthes: “Between Human Development, Human Security, and 
National Security—The Need for Thresholds for People’s Welfare and Dig-
nity and their Intergration into National and International Policy”
Sascha Werthes, Associate Fellow at the Institute for Development and Peace 
(INEF) and Researcher at the Faculty of  Social Science at the University of  
Duisburg-Essen gave a lecture on the concept of  Human Security. Mr Werthes 
provided the participants with a broad overview of  the concept of  human security. 
In the subsequent discussion the methodological and conceptual problems and 
(dis-) advantages of  the concept as well as the challenges for Tunisia and Egypt in 
terms of  human security were discussed.
Mr Werthes started his lecture by elaborating on the term “security.” The term 
was traditionally defined in a very narrow manner, especially during the Cold War. 
Security was seen as an issue of  sovereignty: equated with threats to a country’s 
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borders it was assumed that security threats would mainly emanate from external 
sources. Only after the end of  the Cold War, due to, inter alia, rising numbers of  
people dying of  hunger and diseases and a high number of  intra-state conflicts, 
this state-centric view was challenged. The term “human security” was first men-
tioned in 1994 in the Human Development Report by the United Nations Devel-
opment Program (UNDP). The report argued that the traditional view on security 
had to be expanded and that security and stability in the world could only be 
achieved by putting the individual in focus. It stated that the scope of  global secu-
rity should be expanded to include threats in seven areas: economic, food, health, 
environment, personal, community, and political security. Over time two different 
schools of  thought emerged, which differ in terms of  the scope of  protection and 
the proper instruments and mechanisms: the “narrow school” concentrates on the 
“freedom from fear,” mainly referring to the threat of  political violence to people 
by the state or other political actors. It sees this focus as a necessary means to pur-
sue the goal of  human security successfully. Contrary to that, the “broad school” 
defines human security not only as “freedom from fear” but also as a “freedom 
from want.” Ensuring human security in these broad terms therefore requires not 
only addressing violence but also hunger, diseases etc. This school of  thought is 
often criticized for promoting a concept that is too broad and not manageable. 
Mr Werthes argued that this broad view is nevertheless necessary, even though it 
requires further prioritization. Beside the UNDP-Report of  1994 a second docu-
ment was of  great importance for the advancement and further development of  
the concept of  human security. The report “Human Security Now: Protecting 
and Empowering People” by the Commission on Human Security (CHS) was 
published in 2003. In the report more attention was given to the nexus between 
development and security. According to the report the two concepts are deeply 
intertwined and mutually dependent. Human security is defined as a particular 
form of  human development. It is argued that underdevelopment and horizontal 
inequalities for instance may also cause insecurity, political violence, and conflict. 
According to Mr Werthes the CHS-approach reflects and reconciles ongoing 
debates and the two schools of  thought. In order to achieve human security it sug-
gests an accomplishment of  the traditional “top down” approach of  protection 
with a “bottom up” approach, which stresses the empowerment of  people.
Asked for the added value of  the concept Mr Werthes elaborated that human 
security can mainly serve as an analytical tool as well as a political leitmotif. It 
bases itself  in other well-established concepts to complement and unify them. The 
concept, understood as in the CHS-report, especially bridges the development-
security divide. As a political tool it offers explanation and orientation by identify-
ing priority areas for action. It can be helpful in new areas where development and 
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security policy meet and can guide coordination. Finally and most importantly it 
can motivate and mobilize political actors. The concept makes aware of  the fact 
that it is necessary to create programs and policies in an encompassing way, as it 
stresses the interconnectedness and dependencies between development, stability, 
and security. Mr Werthes reiterated the new “alarm” function, however, empha-
sized that the concept still needs prioritization. The labeling of  problems with 
the term “security” would increase the likelihood of  political action. Mr Werthes 
named the Ottawa convention on the prohibition of  anti-personnel mines as well 
as the establishment of  the International Criminal Court (ICC) as illustrative cases 
for an effective mobilization of  political forces. The banning of  landmines and 
the inception of  the ICC are successful examples where diverse political alliances 
guided by the common idea of  human security managed to reach political solu-
tions. Also the idea of  targeted or selected sanctions has been influenced by this 
concept.
Different participants pointed to the problem of  a missing common definition of  
“human security” as well as to the potential overlap with other concepts like hu-
man rights or the rule of  law. Werthes replied that the concept of  human security 
is less frequently used today and admitted that many policies and actions could 
also be done under the human rights agenda or under human development proj-
ects. Additionally Mr Werthes admitted that a missing common definition might 
be problematic in academic terms. Yet he stressed that this definitional overstretch 
could be practical in political terms, as these “boundary concepts” enable people 
from all over the world to communicate about issues. In his concluding remarks 
Mr Werthes stressed again the analytical relevance of  the concept: by collecting 
and generating disaggregate data of  different geographic locations an early warn-
ing system could be developed. This would help policy-makers and civil society 
determine which regions require which kind of  policies. He concluded that human 
security remains a very contested yet still relevant concept, which can be of  ana-
lytical and practical value if  it is properly applied and if  priorities are defined.
Prof. Dr. Mustapha Kamel Al-Sayyid: “Institutionalization of  Movements 
and the Formation of  New Political Parties—How to become Viable 
Forces”
Prof. Mustapha Kamel Al-Sayyid, Professor for Political Science at Cairo University 
and Executive Director of  Partners-in-Development for Research, Consulting and 
Training, focused in his lecture on the challenges for new political actors to become 
viable forces after the toppling of  presidents Mubarak and Ben Ali. Having lived 
under authoritarian and semi-authoritarian rule for decades, oppositional move-
ments and individuals critical of  the regime suffered from repression and oppres-
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sion and now face the challenge to institutionalize their movements, form political 
parties, and more generally become active and visible political actors. Only if  they 
succeed in doing so, they will be able to participate in the future decision-making 
process and only then a truly pluralistic system can evolve. Some movements, like 
the Muslim Brotherhood, have been more successful in that respect, not least be-
cause they could build on a strong organizational basis, while others like the leftist 
and secular forces still struggle to speak with one voice and to get organized.
At the beginning of  his intervention, Mr Al-Sayyid pointed out several institution-
alization controversies, which revolve around the question of  how the transitional 
period in Egypt should be run. Firstly, he elaborated on the possibility of  intro-
ducing a civil-military presidential council, which could manage and oversee the 
transition. Secondly, he highlighted the importance of  the calendar of  transition, 
i. e. should the constitution be written first, followed by legislative and presiden-
tial elections, or should elections be held before the writing of  the constitution 
begins? Thirdly, he stated that there is a controversial discussion about whether 
Egypt should adopt a presidential, semi-presidential or parliamentary system of  
government. And finally, Mr Al-Sayyid emphasized the ongoing debate on the 
drafting of  new laws regarding the formation of  political parties and new electoral 
laws. He stressed that this topic is often overlooked as the first three controversies 
draw all the attention to themselves. Nevertheless, new electoral laws and regula-
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tions for the formation of  new parties are decisive reforms, which in turn are of  
high importance for introducing real change.
Mr Al-Sayyid highlighted two distinctive features of  the Egyptian revolution. He 
argued that the revolutionaries have been a very heterogeneous and unorganized 
group of  people. They were united in their demand for more justice and freedom, 
better living conditions, and their criticism of  the corrupt regime. But they were 
not unified in one major opposition movement, came from very diverse religious, 
socio-economic, and political backgrounds, and also articulated different priori-
ties. The second feature that Mr Al-Sayyid pointed out was that the revolutionaries, 
who initiated and coordinated the protests in the first place, did not succeed in 
gaining influence, but that mainly other groups profited and will probably come to 
power. He argued that the revolutionaries are still politically marginalized as they 
were not able to form one unified bloc. In contrast, movements that did not stand 
at the forefront of  the protests like the Muslim Brotherhood took advantage of  
the situation and now portray themselves as the only reliable and realistic alterna-
tive to the old regime.
According to Mr Al-Sayyid, revolutionaries and other former opposition move-
ments and individuals have several options. They can try to either establish their 
own party, join other new parties, join established parties, or try to gain legal 
recognition for former underground movements and shift to civil society action. 
Hence the legal conditions for the formation of  new parties are of  great signifi-
cance, but at least equally decisive are available resources like experienced cadres, 
funding, communication skills, access to media, or strategic contacts. Currently, 
the groups that meet most of  these criteria and which are in the best position to 
become influential actors are Islamist groups. The Muslim Brotherhood can build 
on well-established organizational structures, sufficient funding, a long history as 
an oppositional movement, a broad network of  supporters, experienced members, 
and long-standing support from society. Some of  these criteria are met by liberal 
parties supported by wealthy businessmen but they still can hardly rival with the 
Brotherhood. The young revolutionaries on the other hand lack most of  these 
resources, rendering competition on an equal footing unrealistic, especially in the 
short-run. Moreover, they have to overcome the fragmentation among the differ-
ent actors and the challenge of  reconciling party discourses with the conservative 
Egyptian culture. This is an inevitable necessity to reach the masses and to gain 
support from broad sectors of  the population.
Taking all these factors into account, Mr Al-Sayyid concluded that the revolution-
aries might be the losers of  the revolution in the long run. Nevertheless, he ruled 
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out that the Muslim Brotherhood will govern Egypt alone in the near future. He 
does not expect the Brotherhood to win the overall majority in any election, mean-
ing they will be forced to form a coalition, and secondly, he stated that there would 
be too much resistance in the Egyptian society against any attempt by the Brother-
hood or any other force to become the hegemonic ruler of  the country.
Teresa Koloma-Beck, PhD: “Transitional Justice in Post-Authoritarian 
Settings”
Ms Teresa Koloma-Beck, PhD, Research Associate at the Center for Conflict Stud-
ies, Philipps University Marburg, provided the participants with a short overview 
of  the different approaches of  transitional justice and their emergence. Referring 
to German history, especially examples of  the German Democratic Republic 
(GDR) and experiences by herself  and her grandparents, she illustrated the con-
cept and its challenges. This pictorial way of  lecturing allowed the participants to 
gain a very vivid and personal insight into the concept of  transitional justice.
Ms Koloma-Beck started her lecture by reflecting on the German case of  Bran-
denburg and the lustration process, which had taken place in the state of  Branden-
burg after the fall of  the Berlin wall. A newly established commission has come to 
the conclusion that the Stasi past of  many members of  parliament, members of  
government, and especially the former premier of  Brandenburg, Manfred Stolpe, 
has not been examined thoroughly enough. There are allegations that his involve-
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ment has prevented a true process of  historical reappraisal. The report by the 
commission has stimulated heated debates and has generated a lot of  public atten-
tion. After this opening case study, which illustrated the significance and potential-
ly far-reaching consequences of  transitional justice approaches, Ms Koloma-Beck 
elaborated on the concept and history of  transitional justice. Transitional justice 
commonly refers to processes and mechanisms that address the legacy of  past 
violence in order to promote the transition to peace after systematic human rights 
abuses. One can distinguish between two basic notions of  justice: on the one 
hand there is retributive justice, which foresees punishment as central, appropriate 
response to committed atrocities and mainly encompasses judicial prosecution and 
court trials as instruments. On the other hand there is restorative justice, which 
focuses on the need of  victims and perpetrators alike and aims at restoring their 
relationship. This notion is based on the idea of  a participatory approach and does 
not only involve state agencies but also non-state actors on different levels. The 
most prominent instrument besides public apologies are Truth and Reconciliation 
Commissions (TRC). These commissions can be found in different forms and 
kinds in many countries, having their origin in Latin America and with the best-
known TRC in South-Africa. The distinction between these two notions of  justice 
is mainly of  an analytical character. In practice, instruments often involve both 
elements and they can be seen as complementary. Giving a short overview over 
the emergence, development and pursuit of  transitional justice Ms Koloma-Beck 
underlined that the idea is not new but has existed in different forms in history, 
e. g. in shape of  reparations. The contemporary notion of  transitional justice dates 
back to post World War II and developed with major events such as the end of  
the Cold War. The third phase of  transitional justice is associated with contempo-
rary conditions of  persistent conflict, which lay the foundation for a normalization 
of  transitional justice. Being exceptional at the beginning transitional justice has 
turned into a rather conventional tool in peacemaking.
After this brief  conceptual and historical background Ms Koloma-Beck pointed to 
some potential traps and challenges for transitional justice. While she emphasized 
that transitional justice can play a key role in transitions and is often supported 
politically and financially, she noted that transitional justice instruments also operate 
in an area of  tension between justice and peace. As seeking justice in the aftermath 
of  violent conflict may often imply a “naming and shaming” procedure, it could 
potentially be a source of  conflict, incite resentment and even lead to a destabi-
lization of  the country, jeopardizing short-term peace-building efforts. Accord-
ing to Ms Koloma-Beck there are two other important problems to name beside 
this tension between justice and peace. Firstly, there is the risk of  overestimating 
the potential transformative power of  transitional justice. Ms Koloma-Beck sees 
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potential for transitional justice to open up spaces for transformation and provide 
glimpses of  a common future. At the same time, however, it cannot change deep-
rooted problems and move society into this future. Referring to the case of  East-
Germany Ms Koloma-Beck argued that socio-economic justice for example has not 
been achieved and is still a very central issue for many East Germans. Relating to 
this, Ms Koloma-Beck outlined that the idea of  transitional justice is not only about 
truth but also about accountability. Referring again to the Brandenburg case, she 
described how difficult it can be to sort out accountability, as authoritarian rule im-
poses very complex and internally contradicting relationships to the powerful upon 
the individual.
Ms Koloma-Beck named power blindness towards transitional justice as a second 
central problem, i. e. the processes are influenced by national and international 
power relations. Seldom is there “one truth,” as truth depends on one’s own per-
spective and position. Transitional justice processes do not only reveal truth, but 
are rather an arena where an acknowledged version of  history is negotiated. These 
negotiations are of  course influenced and shaped by the distribution of  power 
among the negotiating parties. Also on an international level the power relations 
are of  great importance. Some argue that transitional justice is misused as an 
industry for the export of  certain Western norms and principles. Ms Koloma-Beck 
warned that this should not be the way in which transitional justice is understood: 
transitional justice should not be seen as an end in itself  but rather a process that 
can help a society to move from war and conflict to peace. She emphasized that 
resources exist in every society, institutions and customs for justice, which should 
be acknowledged and taken into account. Referring to this Ms Koloma-Beck 
posed the question of  whether there is really only one concept of  justice in a 
globalized world or rather multiple ones. She encouraged the ISS’s participants to 
think about this question and to try to find their own solutions to this.
In the subsequent discussion the participants tried to find answers for them-
selves and their own countries on how to deal with a legacy of  past violence. Ms 
Koloma-Beck emphasized the context-dependency of  every case not only on a 
national but also on an individual level. Illustrating this, Ms Koloma-Beck referred 
to different cases. In Mozambique for example, where Ms Koloma-Beck has con-
ducted extensive field-research, peace has been traded for justice. In Poland—as in 
contrast to Germany—files by the secret police have not been opened for many 
years to secure societal peace. Giving the example of  her own family she told the 
participants that her grandparents had seen their Stasi files and were very shocked 
about its content and how people in their surrounding had spied on them. After-
wards, she told the participants, they wished they had not seen their files. Discuss-
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ing the problem of  creating a very official history and how to circumvent this 
problem Ms Koloma-Beck suggested that processes which are very close to the 
ground and try to include different people and views are the most successful. And 
socio-economic inequality and feelings of  injustice can be important and decisive 
factors for stability. Closing up the lecture and discussion, Ms Koloma-Beck and 
the ISS’s participants agreed that these factors will be especially important in the 
cases of  Tunisia and Egypt.
Dr. Markus Loewe: “Socio-Economic Malaise as a Security Threat—Which 
Reforms for North Africa?”
Dr. Markus Loewe, Senior Economist at the German Development Institute 
(DIE) in Bonn offered insights into the social policies of  the region and outlined 
the policy shortcomings and the future implications these might have for North 
Africa. Dr. Loewe’s recommendations for social policy reform in the region were 
subsequently discussed together with the ISS’s participants.
Dr. Loewe underlined that there are three main goals which social policies gener-
ally pursue: firstly they have social goals, like preventing people from falling into 
poverty, supporting people who have fallen into poverty or helping people to 
escape from it. Secondly, social policies follow economic goals, like encouraging 
people to take risks, to invest in physical and human capital and to become eco-
nomically active thereby boosting economic growth. Finally, social policies have 
political goals like contributing to social inclusion and justice, as well as strength-
ening social cohesion and stabilizing and appeasing society and the political system. 
Posing the question to what extent social policies in the region have contributed 
to the attainment of  these goals, Mr Loewe argued that the social goals have only 
been fulfilled to a very limited degree. Social policies have mainly benefited the 
urban middle classes rather than the poor. Also economic goals have only been 
attained to a very limited degree: social policies cover employees rather than the 
self-employed, and promotional active labour market policies are largely missing in 
most countries of  the MENA region. In contrast, social policies have indeed had 
significant effects on political goals. However they have not effected the politi-
cal goals of  society in general and contributed to social justice. Rather, they have 
only benefited the regimes in power and their clientele, supporting social exclusion 
instead of  inclusion. Why have social policies not contributed to the attainment of  
the goals?
According to Dr. Loewe the main problem of  social policies is not the funding 
but rather the implementation of  these policies. Social policies are characterized 
by a coverage gap, as only certain parts of  the population benefit and great parts 
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are completely left out. In Egypt for example 25 per cent of  its GDP is spent on 
social protection, but those parts of  the population which are mostly in need of  
assistance are insufficiently targeted. Additionally, the social insurance and health 
sector are heavily segmented. Low income groups are discriminated, while pow-
erful groups and the urban middle classes are preferentially treated. For instance, 
armed forces and high ranking state employees, which only represent 8 per cent of  
the population, receive very generous pensions and benefit from a separate high-
standard health system. This practice creates a class society through the system of  
social protection and results in a redistribution of  public funds from the poor to 
the urban middle class. Even subsidies which should especially target the poor do 
not sufficiently fulfill their aims. For example food subsidies benefit all segments 
of  the population, not mainly the poor, and energy subsidies are mainly advanta-
geous for the richest people in society. While public social assistance schemes 
would be a suitable way to help the poor, expenditures on them are negligible. A 
very important problem of  social policies and its funds are their inefficiency due 
to high administrative costs and an unreasonable use of  instruments. In terms 
of  social transfer spending different schemes coexist without proper coordina-
tion, which leads to high administrative costs, leakages and a duplication of  efforts. 
Social policies are one of  the regimes’ main resources of  legitimacy. Therefore the 
old regimes have done anything possible to prevent non-state actors to become 
active in social policies by applying very restrictive legislation. Private transfers or 
Dr. Markus Loewe is illustrating his argument
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self-help initiatives also hardly play a role in the MENA region, which also distin-
guishes it from other world regions.
Mr. Loewe firstly suggested a few measurements which are rather easy to recom-
mend and rather uncontested: reducing administrative costs in all social systems, 
running more labour-intensive public works in the future, reforming investment 
policies and reducing the contribution rates of  social insurance schemes while rais-
ing the threshold on income for which contributions have to be paid. Mr Loewe 
subsequently gave further recommendations that were more controversial and 
posed more of  a challenge in terms of  convincing policy-makers. These recom-
mendations were intensively discussed by Dr. Loewe and the ISS’ participants: 
firstly, the cutting of  energy subsidies and their redirection to cash transfers to the 
people for labour market policies and social assistance. Secondly, a liberalization 
of  legislation in order to ease the entry of  workers and enterprises to the formal 
sector. Finally, the extension of  coverage of  social insurance to additional groups 
of  the population. In the discussion, rigorous attention was paid to the advantages 
and disadvantages of  direct cash transfers in comparison to investments. The 
group discussed the potential problems for the implementation of  direct cash 
transfers and the cutting of  energy subsidies. Additionally, the reasons why people 
do not enroll in the schemes and the problem of  certain kinds of  investment 
behavior were touched on in the discussion. Dr. Loewe ended his lecture and the 
discussion by drawing the conclusion that the main problem is the unwillingness 
of  the people in power to change the current system of  social policies as it serves 
their own and their clientele’s particular interests. After the toppling of  Ben Ali in 
Tunisia and Mubarak in Egypt great challenges in terms of  social policy reform lie 
ahead. Tackling these problems and the implementation of  reasonable and practi-
cable solutions is pertinent to the security of  the region.
Prof. Fawaz Gerges: “Development and Agenda of  Islamist Forces in Tuni-
sia and Egypt—Implications for the Democratization Process”
Prof. Dr. Fawaz Gerges, Director of  the Middle East Centre at the London School 
of  Economics and Political Science (LSE) began his lecture by stating that over 
the last twenty years a political paradigm of  the MENA region and its societies 
has dominated political and academic debates in the US and GB. He argued that 
the region and its people have been seen through a “bipolar prism” of  “Islamists 
vs. dictators.” This simplistic view has neglected societal segments in between 
those extremes and crudely assumes that the small number of  so-called “Islamists” 
or “extremists” speaks for a powerful segment of  muslim society. Moreover it 
suggests that there is “no culture for democracy” in the region. Prof. Dr. Gerges 
emphasized that this very oversimplified ideological paradigm has become deeply 
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entrenched among British and American political and academic circles, especially 
after the terrorist attacks of  9/11.
Mr Gerges posed the question whether these political and academic circles have 
drawn any lessons from the experiences of  the last months of  protests in the re-
gion. According to him the minority of  Islamists has been more vocal over the last 
years, while the silent majority has been overheard and its social weight has been 
overlooked for a long time. The protests have uncovered and brought this signifi-
cant majority to prominence. He expressed hope that the protests would make 
aware of  the fact that Islamists are only one part of  a very complex mosaic within 
society, that these forces are important but not the driving force behind the upris-
ings in any of  the countries. Mr Gerges emphasized that Islamists are not a mono-
lithic bloc but are rather characterized by many internal divisions among different 
groups and among generations. Mentioning the example of  the Muslim Brother-
hood (MB) in Egypt he outlined that the unifying sense of  opposition to a secular 
dictatorship has faded and various factions are moving towards the political center. 
Illustrative for this is the presidential candidacy of  Dr. Moneim Abou el-Fotouh, a 
popular leader of  the MB, who is however not running as a Brotherhood candidate 
but rather as an independent and mainly represents the MB-youth. According to 
Gerges there are two main problems related to the influence of  Islamist forces: 
Firstly, especially in Egypt, other groups and parties are not very well organized so 
far. Thus, it would be very likely that the Islamists would win the elections. Secondly, 
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Islamist forces have not come up with many ideas about the political system, no 
proper political theorizing has taken place and they have not worked on many criti-
cal issues. Even though they have already gone a long way there is still progress to 
be made especially on issues concerning minorities and women. Prof. Dr. Gerges 
argued that so far “morality” seems to be more important than issues like social 
development, open society or free economy. On the same hand he expressed hope 
that with their political engagement they would come up with ideas on important 
issues. In these terms Mr Gerges designated the Islamists in Turkey, represented 
by the ruling Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, AKP) as 
a potential role model: Turkey’s current prime minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and 
his party have accepted the rules of  the political game and have won three consecu-
tive elections—debunking the view that Islam and democracy cannot coexist.
In the ensuing debate after Prof. Dr. Gerges’ lecture the role of  the Muslim Broth-
erhood, its internal divisions and the term of  Islamists in general was mooted. 
Also the example of  the AKP, which has contradicted traditional theories and 
assumptions about the transformation of  religious-based social movements, was 
discussed. Summing up his lecture Prof. Dr. Gerges stressed the present volatile 
situation, especially in Egypt. Still no one knew how Islamists, like the Muslim 
Brotherhood or Al-Nahda in Tunisia would behave, what percentage of  votes 
they would gain and what kind of  alliances they would forge. In the case of  Egypt 
he expressed  concern about the potential alliance between the army and “main-
stream Islamists.” Thus, the next two or three years will be critical as only time 
can tell how societies will evolve. His last remark concerning the developments in 
the region and the role of  Islamist forces was fairly optimistic: he claimed that the 
protests represented a psychological rupture for the MENA region, which would 
not allow for a return to old political structures. The events resembled the “Arab 
world’s Berlin moment” and Prof. Dr. Gerges expressed hope that although it may 
take a few years the “wall” will not be erected again.
Frederik Fleischmann: “Sustainability of  Processes—Evolutionary Man-
agement as a Guide”
Frederik Fleischmann, Consultant at Evoco GmbH, Berlin, introduced in his 
lecture the concept of  evolutionary management, which is a management model 
for organizations and considers processes in and between organizations as organic 
processes of  life, following the laws and principles of  nature. By applying this 
approach, one can use comparable processes from nature as a basis for creating 
organizational processes in the business world. Hence, it uses nature and evolution 
as a basis for sustainability strategies. The aim was to explore possible linkages to 
sustainability of  political systems and organizations.
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Using evolutionary management, one can draw several conclusions when it comes 
to organizational development. Thereby, it is important to keep in mind that every 
organization has its own history with its specific qualities, traditions, and myth. 
Nevertheless, analyses of  previous evolutionary developments can support deci-
sion-making in future projects. For instance, the past clearly shows that evolution 
doesn’t follow a stringent upward trend and changes its direction. Those changes 
often happen through detours and jumps. Moreover, evolutionary management 
can give hints on the interlinkages between decline, innovation and preservation. 
In this context, Mr Fleischmann highlighted that 99 percent of  all species that 
ever lived are extinct, but that nature always found a way and hence, is the biggest 
innovator on our planet. At the same time, 80 percent of  the genes of  mice and 
humans are identical, which shows that nature not always creates completely new 
creatures. But it improves itself  constantly by producing new designs/shapes and 
by retaining and recombining the approved. A good example for such a procedure 
in the business world is Apple’s iPhone: it includes only very few innovations but 
combines different already existing ideas with a new innovative design and an 
excellent marketing strategy.
Mr Fleischmann explained that the average life-span of  a company is 18 years. Ac-
cording to the Shell-Report, long-existing companies show some common key fac-
tors: 1) they are sensitive to their environment, 2) they are cohesive with a strong 
sense of  identity, 3) they are open-minded about different developments and act 
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tolerantly towards new approaches, and 4) they are conservative in financing. After 
his presentation, Mr Fleischmann discussed with the students if  and how this 
approach might be useful for the recent developments in Egypt and Tunisia. For 
instance, it was discussed in how far political parties and civil society organizations 
can be developed in a sustainable manner by using evolutionary management, as 
well as the sustainability of  the change itself. Even though some skeptical voices 
were raised, many links were discovered.
Dr. Janusz Onyszkiewicz: “Democratization and Security in Central and 
Eastern Europe—Same but Different”
Dr. Janusz Onyszkiewicz, former Polish defense minister and previous member 
and spokesman of  the Polish trade union Solidarność, gave a very vivid lecture 
about democratization in Poland. His lecture evoked great interest among the par-
ticipants and they asked manyfold questions about his own experiences within the 
trade union and during the transitional phase in his home country.
Dr. Onyszkiewicz elaborated on how change came about in Poland and how 
Solidarność successfully contributed to it. He portrayed Poland’s history as one 
of  constant struggle against conquest and occupation at the hands of  external 
actors, with the Polish people forever fighting for their freedom and independence. 
This tradition of  resorting to violent means changed in the 1970s and 1980s as a 
reaction to different historical events: firstly, the trauma of  the end of  the Sec-
ond World War, in which a Polish uprising had caused the total destruction of  
the Polish capital by German forces. Secondly, the uprising in Hungary in 1956, 
which had been quashed by Soviet forces, and finally the Prague spring which also 
resulted in a violent crackdown. All these events, in which uprisings had ended in 
counter-violence by external forces led to deliberations among Polish intellectuals 
and different societal groups that political change would have to come from within 
the society and that they should instead resort to peaceful means to achieve their 
aims. Based on these considerations a civic committee was established in 1976 
following a wave of  strikes that had taken place to protest against a high price 
increase of  many basic commodities. Its members tried to find a legal framework 
under which a strike for change could be organized and peaceful means of  protest 
could be applied. Poland had adopted a convention by the International Labour 
Organisation (ILO) that allowed for the establishment of  trade unions. This “legal 
loophole” was soon discovered and seemed to be a possibility for Poles to orga-
nize themselves and circumvent possible prohibition by the communist authori-
ties. It was merely necessary to inform the authorities about its foundation and 
existence. Thus, trade unions were established and even though they were very 
small at the beginning they rapidly gained experience and developed stable orga-
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nizational structures. In the 1980s another rise of  costs especially for food and 
other basic commodities took place. This provoked a general strike by the inde-
pendent trade unions. Lech Wałesa led one of  these strike committees. Due to its 
large scale the government felt pressured and started to negotiate with the union’s 
leaders. The protests by the trade unions went far beyond the issue of  food prices: 
political demands were raised and the establishment of  political parties was re-
quested. Over time, the trade union Solidarność took on more and more activities, 
it became more politicized and the number of  its members sharply increased up to 
10 million.
The only answer for the authorities to this growing power and influence of  
Solidarność seemed to be to introduce martial law in 1981. The movement was 
consequently driven underground. Despite this repression the union was not 
completely destroyed. On the contrary the union was pursuing more and more 
underground activities inter alia an underground press that produced a weekly 
paper with a circulation of  60,000 copies. Over the years it became clear that the 
imposition of  martial law could neither defuse growing social unrest nor diminish 
the trade union’s societal and political influence. Realizing this, the government 
authorities offered to negotiate with the movement in 1988. A “Round table” with 
members of  government, Solidarność and other oppositional groups was estab-
lished. Solidarność was ready to accept a change from a totalitarian regime to an 
autocratic regime that offered only certain basic freedoms. At the same time there 
Dr. Janusz Onyszkiewicz is elaborating on the Polish democratization
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were hopes among the union’s representatives that these limited freedoms would 
end up becoming greater freedoms, triggering a process of  change. During the 
negotiations the government offered “elections” to Solidarność, which would 
have resulted in a pre-defined division of  seats in parliament between the govern-
ment and Solidarność, reserving 65 per cent of  seats for the government and 35 
per cent for the union. However, the Solidarność negotiators did not request the 
35 per cent for themselves but demanded that these 35 per cent of  seats should be 
offered to anyone. This meant that at least for these 35 per cent of  seats semi-free 
elections should take place. In June 1990 these elections took place and all worries 
by Solidarność were allayed as it won all of  the 35 per cent of  seats. It demanded 
political power and by the end of  August a Solidarność-led coalition government 
was formed. In December 1990 Lech Wałesa became elected president of  Poland. 
These elections resulted in an overall change in the political atmosphere and with 
Glasnost and Perestroika happening in the USSR at the same time, the end of  
communism in Poland was sealed.
After this historical review of  the emergence of  Solidarność and its contribution 
to political transition in Poland, Dr. Onyszkiewicz identified general problems that 
have to be tackled whenever and wherever political transformation takes place. 
One great problem and challenge in Poland was the integration of  old elites. This 
challenge is also of  current interest for the situation in Egypt and Tunisia. Accord-
ing to Onyszkiewicz it was essential during the phase of  transition that they were 
integrated and that only those who had really broken the law were prosecuted. 
Another major problem was the creation of  an independent judiciary. Mr On-
yszkiewicz emphasized that an independent judiciary was of  great importance as 
it was alien to the communist system. He described that they did not know how 
the judges would behave in the new system and there were great problems at the 
beginning as the independence and impartiality of  the judiciary was not ensured 
in the first transitional years. Also the role of  the army and how to deal with it was 
among one of  the central problems. As the army resembles a very undemocratic 
structure within a democracy and the army has factual power, the installation and 
guaranteeing of  democratic, civilian control is of  high importance. On the whole, 
Mr Onyszkiewicz concluded that Poland has successfully dealt with these prob-
lems and challenges. He argued that the most important condition for a successful 
contribution to Poland’s political transition was the imperative that the movement 
stays united despite attempts by the ruling authorities to create frictions among 
them. The main reason for its united standing can be found in its character as a 
trade union and the common goal of  fighting for democracy. It was not until later 
in the transitional phase that the existing streams within the movement diversified 
and different parties and organizations were founded.
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Summarizing Solidarność’s role Dr. Onyszkiewicz emphasized that it was essen-
tial that it deprived communism of  its legitimacy and that it managed to develop 
such a great size and influence that the authorities had to accept that martial law 
would not put an end to their activities and to the political demands of  the people. 
Finally, it was also central that Solidarność sensed that the so-called Brezhnev 
Doctrine would not be valid anymore under Mikhail Gorbachev and that he would 
not resort to violent means. Thus in Onyszkiewicz pictorial language, Solidarność 
was the actor which had to “draw the tail of  the lion,” to test whether it was really 
dead and thus to prove that Soviet forces would really not intervene anymore in 
their satellite states. Being asked by one participant where he sees the main dif-
ferences between Poland and Tunisia or Egypt Onyszkiewicz pointed out that in 
contrast to Poland the latter ones already had market economies. Most importantly, 
the political forces in these countries do not stand united. In Egypt for example 
40 parties have been created so far, which Onyszkiewicz termed a “recipe for 
disaster.” Therefore, Dr. Onyszkiewicz recommended to the participants and 
political forces in the two countries to keep together and to form political blocks. 
Otherwise, he warned, they would lose the upcoming elections. He added that they 
should offer some political space for certain old guards of  the regime and that 
young Egyptians and Tunisians should be very careful with the army. Discussing 
once more the role of  the army in transition, Dr. Onyszkiewicz explained that the 
Polish army is highly respected and that it accepted a passive role as well as civilian 
control. This could be mainly attributed to the fact that the army had always been 
under communist control and that parts of  the army also had some “sense of  
guilt,” as they had quashed several revolts under communist rule. Discussing the 
role of  external actors like the European Union (EU), Dr. Onyszkiewicz argued 
that the EU played a certain role in political transition, but only at a very late stage 
of  the process, by setting the incentive of  EU membership. The support of  civil 
society through the EU has been and should be important—also in Egypt and 
Tunisia.
PD Dr. Andreas Ufen: “Transition in Indonesia—A Crisis of  Democratic 
Governance”
Setting out for new horizons and trying to bridge the experiences in other world 
regions with the ones in the MENA region PD Dr. Andreas Ufen, Research Fel-
low at the GIGA Institute of  Asian Studies in Hamburg, Germany, provided the 
participants with insights into the transition process in Indonesia. According to 
him the case of  Indonesia can be defined as successful and as one which has not 
undergone a major crisis of  democratic governance.
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After imbedding Indonesia in the Southeast-Asian region and drawing regional 
comparisons, Mr Ufen gave a short overview of  Indonesia’s history, mainly con-
centrating on the Suharto Era between 1965 and 1998. Suharto came to power 
through a coup in 1965 and established a very authoritarian neo-patrimonial 
system based on a strong military. There were elections but they were neither free 
nor fair as “Golkar,” the ruling party, always gained 60 per cent of  seats and Su-
harto acted as “final arbiter” in all decisions. Political Islam was subdued, however 
from 1980 onwards a state-controlled islamization took place. Indonesia was very 
western-oriented and characterized by a strong export-oriented modernization. Its 
middle class and civil society were weak and Indonesia’s major companies were 
controlled by the military, relatives of  generals or by Chinese cronies. However, 
in the late 1980s and 1990s a growing liberalization mainly in form of  a transfor-
mation of  the economy began. This transformation was embossed by increased 
Foreign Direct Investments (FDI), the emergence of  a new middle class, and 
increased pressure for reform and deregulation through International Financial 
Institutions (IFIs). More and more NGOs were established, which also started a 
discourse on human rights and democratization. Additionally, while parties and 
trade unions were officially illegal, they became to a certain extent tolerated by the 
state. Very essential for the transition was factionalism within the army as great 
parts were discontent with Suharto and his family.
Drawing links to the case of  Egypt, Mr Ufen mentioned several similarities 
between the two countries: the authoritarian system with a strong military, a 
controlled bureaucracy, one ruling party, manipulated and hardly competitive 
elections, and a neo-patrimonial leader. Also the forms of  repression have been 
similar, as well as the regimes’ western-oriented modernization. Both countries 
witnessed similar forms of  repression and Islamist underground movements, as 
well as mostly secular, heterogeneous opposition movements. While in Indonesia 
the transformation was mainly triggered by financial crisis, Mr Ufen could not 
see a clear trigger in the case of  Egypt. Finally the military did not intervene, but 
pushed a neo-patrimonial leader to resign. Coming back to the case of  Indonesia, 
Mr Ufen described that in May 1998 the discontent parts of  the military, as well 
as members of  Suharto’s party “Golkar” and external actors pressured Suharto to 
step down from power. Thus, the transition in Indonesia was not one from below 
but rather an arranged and protracted transition. It resulted in grand coalitions and 
a form of  “patrimonial democracy.” The newly elected president Bucharuddin 
Habibie was forced to initiate reforms: new parties and independent trade unions 
were established, basic political rights were guaranteed and a referendum in East 
Timor was held. According to Mr Ufen, the transition in Indonesia can be divided 
into three phases: the first encompasses the months around the first elections and 
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shows a development towards a rather fragile electoral democracy. The second 
phase between 1999 and 2004 includes the second elections and is characterized 
by a development towards a consolidated electoral democracy. Finally, the third 
phase from 2004 until today can be described as one of  a consolidation of  democ-
racy towards a liberal democracy.
Giving an outlook on the present and future of  Indonesia’s democracy Mr Ufen 
named a great number of  achievements: Indonesia today can be characterized as 
a stable presidential democracy with a multi-party system. Free and fair elections 
have taken place three times during the last years and there are major improve-
ments regarding civil rights and political liberties. The Indonesian armed forces 
are today under civilian control and a decentralization has taken place since 2001, 
which has been of  great importance in a multiethnic community like Indonesia. 
Related to this characteristic, a resolution of  conflicts beyond Java has been ob-
tained; there are no serious forms of  secession or civil war. After the great eco-
nomic crisis the economy has developed and stabilized. Finally, the general sup-
port for democracy among the population is high. Thus, overall, the transition has 
been very successful. Nevertheless, some failures and insufficiencies have to be 
named: past crimes have not been investigated thoroughly enough. In West Timor 
and Irian Jayah (Western Papua) human rights violations are still taking place. 
There is widespread corruption, a cartel of  political parties and collusion among 
political elites. Despite some economic growth, gross social inequalities continue 
PD Dr. Andreas Ufen leads into the Extreme Orient
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to exist. The country also experiences a renaissance of  anti-liberal Islamism (e. g. a 
new pornography law) as well as violence against religious and ethnic minorities.
PD Dr. Ufen concluded his lecture by describing Indonesia as a case where transi-
tion has been arranged and protracted and as one which shows the compatibility 
of  Islam and democracy. Indonesia could also serve as an example illustrating that 
the relationship between economic development and democratization is far more 
complex than traditional modernization theory assumes. Finally, even though 
democratization has also led to new conflicts in the country, democracy has also 
made it possible to solve them. In the Q&A-Session the role of  the old elites was 
discussed. Mr Ufen explained that these elites were part of  the transition process 
and that they are still part of  the regime today. Hence there is still a widespread 
“culture of  impunity,” the military is still very strong, and the old bureaucracy is 
influential. Mr Ufen was also asked for the reasons for the current shortcomings 
and failures in the country: he elaborated that the rather low economic develop-
ment could be attributed to the wide-spread corruption endemic in the Indonesian 
system. There are no trade unions. Finally, a very central problem identified is the 
wide gap between the political class and civil society and PD Dr. Ufen emphasized 
once more how important factionalism within the military had been in Indonesia 
and that civilian control over the military has been established, even though the 
military is still a very strong actor today.
Almut Möller: “The EU Neighbourhood Policy—Critical Review and the 
Way Forward”
Almut Möller, Head of  DGAP’s Alfred von Oppenheim-Center for European 
Policy Studies, very critically assessed in her lecture the EU Neighbourhood Policy 
(ENP) in its Southern dimension. She emphasized that Europe’s answer to the 
transformation processes in Central and Eastern Europe was enlargement and 
posed the question about the adequate and necessary reaction of  the EU to recent 
developments in North Africa. Ms Möller argued that enlargement was a success-
ful strategy to support Central and Eastern European states in their democratic 
transitions, but that with the enlargement fatigue, the financial crisis, and other 
factors it cannot be the solution for North Africa. Still a comprehensive approach 
and solid strategy are necessary. But since the EU continues to define its interests 
regardless of  people’s needs in its Southern neighborhood, the development of  a 
common strategy deviating from past policies seems in her eyes very challenging 
and difficult to realize.
Ms Möller argued that the EU is geographically tied to very different neighbors, 
rendering the establishment of  relations and cooperation a difficult task that 
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requires diversity, flexibility, and a solid knowledge base about societies in the re-
spective countries. The ENP was a very ambitious project inspired by the freedom 
and liberation movements after 1989. The concept as such was a huge step into 
the right direction and in the case of  Central and Eastern Europe proved effective. 
But the situation differs clearly in the Southern Mediterranean. The main deficien-
cies lie in the implementation. In general, one has to admit that the ENP towards 
the Southern neighborhood was not very successful and positive effects are hard 
to find. She pointed out that the ENP is still essential for the survival and suc-
cess of  the EU but that a thorough review was necessary and is still taking place. 
Realizing that it has to change its course with the changes in the Arab world, the 
EU drew up three documents that appeared after the uprisings in the Arab world. 
One appeared in March 2011 in which the ENP is reaffirmed whilst admitting that 
there were deficits in implementation and that there is a need for offering more 
incentives to Arab countries for carrying out genuine democratic reforms. The 
second one appeared on 25 May and the third on 30 May.
Despite these efforts, Ms Möller still sees several weaknesses with the ENP. No 
clear thresholds for human rights performance in the respective countries were 
defined. The more-for-more principle, i. e. granting countries that perform well 
in the realization of  political reforms more support and privileges, has flaws as 
double standards are already the norm (i. e. Saudi Arabia) and a negative condition-
ality was not specified. Besides, the three documents are not binding. Trade and 
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migration, two of  the most fiercely demanded openings by the North African side 
that would positively affect the income and perspectives of  millions of  citizens, 
have no specific breaking-through provision. One of  the main additional weak-
nesses she observes is the almost exclusive focus on governments as negotiation 
partners. The ENP envisages a highly institutionalized, formal, and technocratic 
approach, which hardly leaves any space for the inclusion of  civil society actors. 
The same applies to the Union of  the Mediterranean, which is rather an inter-state 
union. Ms Möller stressed that civil society inclusion is essential for the legitimacy, 
effectiveness, and sustainability of  relations and joint endeavors and that therefore 
cooperation should not only be left to politicians. Especially regarding social and 
economic projects and programs, in the past major stakeholders such as trade 
unions, NGOs, independent technocrats and researchers were excluded from the 
negotiation process with the EU, a fatal mistake that she believed needs to be 
eliminated. The contradiction between security and stability interests on the one 
hand and a value driven policy such as democratic reform and the promotion of  
human rights on the other hand was another major weakness identified to which 
Ms Möller had no ready-made solution, saying that values are subordinated to 
economic and strategic interests especially in a globalized world witnessing fierce 
economic competition and a scramble for natural resources, and that security and 
stability concerns will continue to dominate. This dilemma will haunt the EU’s 
policies towards other countries and regions, but Möller pledged for the EU to 
be more vocal about these priorities, decrease hypocritical statements, and be less 
ambitious and more realistic with documents and declarations.
She equally lamented that the ENP reform debate and other policy debates related 
to North Africa are currently drifting towards a classical security debate that very 
likely will again produce deficient outcomes. Additionally, instead of  continuing 
its bilateral approach, the EU should include other significant regional actors such 
as Turkey and the GCC countries in its endeavors and policy formulation target-
ing the region, taking into consideration that the ENP is but one small instrument 
that could be complementary to other initiatives on different levels and that needs 
to be neatly coordinated with these very initiatives. Ms Möller was also skeptical 
about the suggestion to create the European Endowment for Democracy, a facility 
that should promote civil society and assist in the democratization process. Sub-
stance questions were not adequately answered, and how this new instrument will 
be structured, managed, and coordinated with other existing facilities working in 
the same domain was left unclear. Hence, the way forward is very difficult for her 
to predict. The EU is closely watching developments in its neighborhood and it 
has to be prepared for new insecurities resulting from changing dynamics in the 
region. Syria, Libya, and Palestine, and a change of  political actors in North Africa 
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are but a few examples. For Ms Möller the EU has to carry out a soul searching 
process and decide whether it sincerely wants to reach to its Southern neighbors, 
increase its eye-to-eye cooperation with these countries, and eliminate deficien-
cies in its knowledge base about Arab societies. The initial goal of  the ENP to 
mainly establish a platform for communication could not be more relevant today, 
especially with the current turbulences in North Africa and the reshuffling of  
coordinates. More knowledge and understanding need to be nurtured on the side 
of  the EU, as the region will certainly become more diverse and heterogeneous. 
She stated that in former times the Mediterranean rather connected both regions, 
while today it is widely perceived as a border that separates countries and people, 
and polices follow this logic. Hence the main question for her is whether the EU 
has a genuine interest and willingness to build bridges across this natural “border.”
Henriette Sachse and Laura Fueser: “Germany’s Development Cooperation 
with North Africa—Lessons Learnt and New Approaches”
To introduce Germany’s approaches and strategies for development cooperation 
in general and with North Africa in particular—and to discuss possible lessons 
learnt from the most recent developments with the students, two employees of  
the Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) visited 
the Summer School: Laura Fuesers, who is working in the ministry’s Policy Plan-
ning Staff, and Henriette Sachse, who is Desk Officer for Syria, Jordan, Iraq at the 
Near and Middle East Division.
Henriette Sachse and Laura Fuesers gave an overview over Germany’s development cooperation
 
EU-Middle East Forum 46
Lectures, Panels and 
Presentations
Ms Sachse explained that development cooperation with MENA countries is 
always related to one of  four topics: water, energy (esp. renewable energy), educa-
tion, and/or economic cooperation. Those focal points are guiding Germany’s de-
velopment cooperation in the MENA region. In general the BMZ is cooperating 
with nine partner countries in the region: Morocco, Mauritania, Algeria, Tunisia, 
Egypt, Jordan, the Palestinian territories, Syria and Yemen. Because of  the recent 
developments and the current insecure situation, the BMZ has temprarily stopped 
any cooperation with Syria and Yemen. The type of  cooperation with specific 
countries highly depends on the needs of  the respective partner. For instance, the 
cooperation with Jordan is mainly focused on the water sector. In every project, 
the BMZ attaches great importance to the inclusion of  participatory elements, 
since the BMZ regards civil society in the partner countries as essential for the 
success of  any cooperation. One of  the main instruments for the cooperation 
with MENA countries is funding of  developmental projects. The BMZ currently 
provides three main funds: 1) the BMZ has invited political foundations to focus 
on the transformation processes in Tunisia and Egypt, and is providing funds for 
respective initiatives; 2) another fund (eight million Euros) is provided for employ-
ment initiatives, especially in the youth sector; and 3) the third fund (20 million 
Euros) is mainly for micro-financing and will be disttributed to different banks in 
the region, which will then provide loans for small enterprises.
Laure Fuesers raised the question why Germany should actually be active in 
development cooperation in the MENA region at all. She explained that there are 
two main political reasons: 1) the MENA region is Europe’s immediate neighbor-
hood and hence, it is in Europe’s own interest that the region is stable; 2) because 
of  Germany’s history, the Middle-East conflict is a very sensitive topic in Ger-
many and hence, the region is of  special interest. Those two reasons go hand in 
hand with Germany’s general commitment to liberal, democratic values, which 
necessitates the support for the current transformation and the improving of  
living conditions. The representatives explained that the BMZ is mainly work-
ing bilaterally, but also through the EU level, especially in the framework of  the 
European Neighborhood Policy (ENP). Moreover, the G8-process is essential for 
the ministry’s work. At the same time, Ms Fuesers emphasized that development 
cooperation is not only a matter of  governments but that the business sector and 
civil society should be involved in the process. According to her, this approach has 
become more important under the current minister. Unlike other states, who only 
deal with governments in their development cooperation, the BMZ has also the 
possibility to communicate with civil society by supporting political foundations 
who are active in the region.
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Prof. Bağci during his lecture on Turkey’s role in the Middle East
Prof. Dr. Hüseyin Bağcı:	“Potentials	and	Limits	of 	Turkey	as	a	Partner	in	
the Arab Region”
The group experienced a very heated and interesting debate during Professor 
Bağcı’s session, Professor of  International Relations at the Middle East Techni-
cal University in Ankara. He kicked off  the presentation by explaining that he 
has been accompanying the summer school for more than a decade and that the 
change in topics of  the school went hand in hand with changes on the interna-
tional scene, starting with a focus on the Balkans and Eastern Europe in the 1990’s, 
moving to the war on terror and the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq as a result of  
9/11 and related security challenges, and now depicting the historic transforma-
tions in the Arab region and the unprecedented uprisings that spilled over from 
one country to another.
Mr Bağcı emphasized that in the recent past Turkey has been receiving major and 
increasing attention regionally and worldwide and that this trend will continue, 
the reason being a major shift in the country’s standing and development. In the 
1990’s Turkey was considered a human rights violator that sentences the death 
penalty, suppresses the Kurds, severely limits freedoms etc. Then in 1999 it be-
came a candidate for the EU accession and in 2005 the negotiation process started. 
By then it was not considered a deficit democracy any longer. Bağcı stressed that 
Turkey learned extensively from the negotiation process and that today it is a 
Muslim country with a Western democratic system, hence a model for the Islamic 
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world. The political boost was accompanied by a massive modernization program 
and economic growth that helped stabilize the political gains. Turkey is now a 
member in the G20, occupies the 16th place in the world’s strongest economies, 
and by 2030 is predicted to reach place 11 while Germany will be on place 5. All 
these rapid developments dramatically increased the country’s influence, a develop-
ment far beyond the expectations or anticipations of  its people and government. 
As a consequence of  its attractiveness, Arab money is flowing in, Arab tourism is 
on the rise, and the country became a hub for Arab intellectuals and writers. He 
also highlighted the multiculturalism present in Turkey and added that Turkey to-
gether with Iran and Egypt are regionally the most multicultural societies in terms 
of  politics, culture, and religion. A question that quickly surfaced was if  Turkey 
will eventually turn its back towards Europe and endorse the Islamic world. Bağcı 
doubted that this will occur, but he stressed that Turkey is not obliged to listen 
to Brussels and that the country is relatively independent. He argued that Turkey 
wants to become a global player without leaving Western institutions because it 
extracts its strength from these very ones. It therefore seeks a balance between 
the West and the Middle East region, and due to Turkey’s economic and politi-
cal power it shoulders an increased responsibility. In his opinion Turkey will not 
become an Islamic state because of  a historical determination since 1856 where 
Turkey became a European state in the sense of  state formation. Bağcı held the 
view that, among others, because of  the European dimension in Turkey’s political 
system and society it is attractive for the Arab region, and in general, its political, 
economic, and cultural reality moved it to the center of  regional and international 
politics and attraction.
He stated that recent developments in the Middle East are interesting and clearly 
affecting Turkey as well. Along the country’s borders are numerous countries 
and it is located in the vicinity of  16 major conflict areas. With the escalation of  
violence in Syria, people are fleeing to Turkey. But for him, there is no such thing 
as a bad versus a good revolution. Despite the destabilizing effect the uprisings are 
inflicting on the region, he sees the changes that are occurring exactly 100 years 
after the fall of  the Ottoman Empire followed by colonialism and the indepen-
dence movements as unique and he believes that they will create a new order in 
the Middle East with a new generation and new perspectives that might lead to 
a more peaceful region. During the Cold War the Arab world was dominated by 
Gamal Abdel Nasser’s voice, propagating pan-Arabism and designing policies ac-
cordingly. Today, he pointed out, there is not a single Arab leader clearly endorsing 
the region. Because of  this political vacuum, Turkey stepped in, which is a normal 
phenomenon in international politics. He stressed that Turkey has never been as 
strong economically, politically, and culturally as it is today and that it is a soft pow-
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er in the Middle East. Concerning perceptions of  Turkey on the Arab side, Bağcı 
observed that Arab intellectuals have mixed feelings towards the country: some 
aggrandize the Turkish model while others are very cautious and skeptical. But he 
believed that Turkey being for example the only country in the region speaking up 
against Israel lends it popularity especially among the masses on the streets. He 
pledged for Turkey to heavily invest in the youth in the Middle East on an intel-
lectual level and to intensify the trend of  Arab tourism. As Turkey is the strongest 
economic power in the region and is a major exporter, it offers very lucrative busi-
ness opportunities that Arab countries should seize and he stressed that economic 
interdependence is already a reality.
Although the country is culturally and economically very advanced, Bağcı lamented 
several political deficiencies. One political party had been dominant in the past 
ten years and it endorses ideologically Islamic positions. Only three ministers are 
not followers of  this line of  thought. The Turkish foreign minister’s zero-problem 
policy with neighboring countries proved to be only good on paper and to ease 
historical bills and nurture the spirit of  the time, namely that of  cooperation rather 
than confrontation. But within one year from announcing this policy, Libya and 
Syria turned into serious problematic neighbors and the Arab spring has forced 
Turkey to thoroughly rethink its policies and politics. Bağcı explained that the 
foreign minister sees the Arab spring as advantageous for Turkey and conducive 
to its foreign policy. He formulated five principles that now should guide Turkish 
policies towards the region, the major ones being: 1. security for all countries in 
the region; 2. democracy for all and promotion of  its backbone, which is a stable 
and big middle class; 3. political dialogue with all actors including non-state actors. 
In Turkey there is a mushrooming of  organizations, which is a sign for democracy, 
and Ankara has become the epicenter for Arab NGOs to debate and dialogue. 
This, according to Bağcı, should be further intensified and expanded. At the end 
he urged the new political actors to select a leader, a father figure, which guides 
the countries through these transformations, as without leadership he thinks the 
process is doomed to fail.
In the Q&A-session, critique was inter alia expressed concerning the reality of  
Israeli-Turkish relations and that rather artificial internal politics lead to an Israel 
bashing that is not in line with the reality of  their real bi-lateral relations. There 
were also many critical voices concerning the country’s model function, especially 
in light of  grave political deficits such as the curtailment of  the right of  veiled 
women, minorities’ rights, and the right to freedom of  expression and thought. 
And participants believed that Turkey is fearful of  competition from Egypt and 
that this is the driving force behind its regional outreach. Finally, they saw the 
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main problem of  many Arab countries in their patrimonial system with a head that 
is detached from people’s aspirations and needs and therefore completely rejected 
a father figure. They insisted on the need for a leadership (maybe a league of  wise 
women and men) sharing people’s values and aspirations and criticized prioritizing 
securitization instead of  democratic reforms in Turkey’s foreign policy towards 
North Africa.
Dr. Muriel Asseburg: “Developments in Syria—Implications Nationally, 
Regionally and, Internationally”
Dr. Muriel Asseburg presented in her lecture different scenarios for developments 
in the escalating conflict in Syria. She termed it a slow-motion revolution, a term 
used by the International Crisis Group, because the uprising took a long time until 
it reached Damascus and other bigger cities. Her analysis showcased that the Syr-
ian case differs in two aspects from other uprisings in the region, especially those 
in Egypt and Tunisia. The first aspect is the fact that in Syria the uprisings were 
ignited and carried out by local marginalized groups of  different ages, not mainly 
middle-class youth as in the cases of  Egypt and Tunisia. The second aspect is 
related to the role of  the military that from the beginning brutally cracked down 
on the protestors. She identified the main grievances to be the exacerbating socio-
economic conditions in the country. The economic opening only favored an elite 
and left the majority of  the population with higher living costs while no adequate 
social polices and reforms were undertaken parallel to the economic liberalization 
and modernization program. Severe droughts have resulted in migration of  a large 
number of  Syrians from the Eastern provinces towards the West, thereby increas-
ing the economic and social burden of  the other provinces. The second grievance 
is political in nature, namely the absence of  political reforms and the perpetuation 
of  one of  the most repressive regimes in the region and even worldwide.
Asseburg explained that in the past and despite its repressiveness, the regime 
still enjoyed popularity on the national and regional level but that Assad failed to 
detect the waning of  his and the system’s popularity within the population. Nev-
ertheless, the number of  protestors was still relatively low, and she believed that 
Syrians are hesitant to engage out of  fear of  a civil war. The society is already 
branded by the civil war in Iraq and the large number of  refugees who fled to 
Syria, but she also stressed that there is still sympathy with the regime within large 
parts of  society and that minorities are relatively well treated and people appreci-
ate the relative stability characteristic of  the country. Another factor that clearly 
hampered the uprising was the immense brutality used from the very beginning by 
the regime, but she predicted that in the long run this brutality will rather increase 
the number of  protestors. According to Asseburg, the regime reacted by alleged 
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concessions and by introducing subsidies and reshuffling the government. At the 
same time the regime blamed Islamists to be behind the uprisings, termed the 
demands of  the protestors as illegitimate, and continued its severe repression of  
the peaceful protests, rendering the concessions negligent. The opposition tired 
to organize on a national and international level and across ethnic and religious 
lines but Asseburg noted that there was a split between the traditional opposi-
tion (the Damascus Spring group of  2000/2001) and new opposition forces, the 
former demanding dialogue rather than a continuation of  the protests. Besides, no 
consensus could be reached on the inclusion of  the Muslim Brotherhood. Turkey 
hosted several meetings of  the opposition and the National Council for Salvation 
that was established and included groups of  the opposition except for the Kurds, 
the reasoning being their demand to remove the term “Arabic” from the name of  
the country.
Asseburg predicted a steady escalation of  the conflict that would spread all over 
the country and emphasized that the status quo can never be upheld and the 
Assad regime stabilized. But she only saw a glimpse of  hope for the protesters 
and the chance of  toppling the regime by defections from within the regime and 
high-ranking officers in the army. She pointed out that an alarming phenomena is 
the rising sectarian tension that could lead to more violence but also a full-fledged 
civil war with major regional repercussions and a probable Turkish military inter-
vention. Asseburg ruled out a negotiated regime change as too much blood has 
Dr. Muriel Asseburg during her talk on Syria
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already been spilled and the opposition was unlikely to accept this. As to the reac-
tion of  the international community, Asseburg gave a sobering assessment, point-
ing out that Western states are very cautious with the Assad regime because of  re-
gional implications and that therefore they only slowly stepped up pressure on the 
regime. The US for example is expecting the opposition to find a solution through 
negotiations. Asseburg criticized that the Security Council only condemned the 
bloodshed after attacks were carried out on foreign embassies and not as a reac-
tion to the killing of  1600 people. Regional actors such as Hamas have distanced 
themselves from the regime, creating tensions on the axis Syria-Hizbollah-Hamas-
Iran. Israel is ambivalent, as with Assad it had a relatively calm border and with the 
rise of  new actors such as the Muslim Brotherhood, this situation could change.
At the end Asseburg insisted that a military intervention would only aggravate the 
conflict and that instead, the international community should increase its political 
and economic pressure while supporting the opposition technically.
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Social Activities and Visits to German 
Institutions
The 15th International Summer School’s program included a number of  social 
activities and events as well as visits to various institutions and organizations in 
Berlin. By organizing social activities, the Summer School aims at building a strong 
bond between the participants, making it a unique and sustainable cross-cultural 
experience. By visiting different political institutions such as the Ministry of  De-
fence, the participants have the chance to interact with political actors and learn 
more about German policies and strategies. By visiting other organizations such 
as an electoral research institute different important elements of  a full-fledged 
democracy became visible.
Scavenger Hunt
On the first day of  the program, following the official opening and the first lec-
ture, the participants embarked on a scavenger hunt through Berlin. In four teams 
they made their way through four different neighborhoods and explored the city’s 
history, culture, and its people. Afterwards, the evening was rounded off  with a 
dinner on DGAP’s terrace where the participants had the chance to share their 
experiences and to get to know each other in a relaxed atmosphere..
One group is posing with the famous East-German car “Trabant” during the Scavenger Hunt
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Visit to the Office of the Federal Commissioner for preserving the records of 
the Ministry for State Security of the GDR (BStU)—Joachim Förster: “Dealing 
with the State Security of Despotic Regimes—Germany’s Experience with the 
Stasi and Lessons Learnt for Egypt and Tunisia”
What importance do the “Stasi Archives” hold with regards to coming to terms 
with the recent German past and to what extent can these experiences be related 
to the cases of  Tunisia and Egypt? Trying to find answers to these questions, the 
ISS’s participants visited the archives of  the Office of  the Federal Commissioner 
for the Files of  the State Security Service (BStU) of  the former German Demo-
cratic Republic (GDR) on the third day of  the International Summer School. Par-
ticipants gained insights into the methods and procedures of  the GDR Ministry 
for State Security (MfS), popularly known as the Stasi . The former Stasi was a vast 
organization that the East German regime used to suppress citizens who were op-
posed to its ideologies. While in operation, the Stasi accumulated millions of  data 
and photo material of  East German citizens. The participants were astonished and 
at the same time dismayed about the huge amount of  files and index cards, which 
can today be found in the archives. On a tour through the building the participants 
found out that about 111,000 meters of  files have been archived so far. Encoun-
tering some bags with shredded files, the archivists explained that when East 
Germany collapsed in 1989 the Stasi officers tried to destroy evidence of  their 
activities through mass destruction of  the files. Fortunately, demonstrators man-
aged to occupy many branches of  the Stasi-offices, to stop the destruction, and 
to save most of  the files. However, there are still about 15,000 bags of  shredded 
files in total while only around 440 of  these bags have been reconstructed so far, 
amounting to about a million Stasi files. Illustrating the great importance of  offer-
ing people the possibility to deal with their past and to find out who denounced 
them to the Stasi, the participants were told that the office received over six mil-
lion applications for file inspections between 1991 and 2011 by victims, journalists 
and government officials.
After the tour, Joachim Förster, Head of  the Department AU (Auskunft/Ver-
wendung von Unterlagen) of  the BStU, gave a short lecture about the foundation 
and structure of  the BStU. He stated that it was not easy for Germans to decide 
how to deal best with what happened under the communist regime in the GDR. 
There was unease among the population about whether or not to release informa-
tion gathered by the Stasi to the public. Today, a government law allows the public 
access to these strictly regulated files. The BStU’s experience of  how to deal with 
files is seen as a good example by governments of  countries that also have to find 
a way to come to terms with dark chapters of  their history. He told the partici-
pants that the BStU is not only cooperating with many institutions in Eastern 
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Europe, but that it has also just recently established ties with Egypt to discuss the 
question of  how to deal with the legacy left by the country’s secret police.
Visit to the Federal Ministry of Defence—Major General Karl Müllner: “The 
Role of the Military in a Democratic System and Ongoing Operations of the 
German Armed Forces”
To get a better understanding of  Germany’s security and defense approach as well 
as the role that the military plays in the German democratic system, the Summer 
School was invited to the Federal Ministry of  Defence, situated in the famous 
Bendler Block. At the ministry, Major General Karl Müllner received the visi-
tors, introduced the foundations of  German defense policy, and discussed several 
related topics with the students.
Major General Müllner highlighted the role of  history for understanding German 
defense policies. After World War II the German armed forces were completely 
demolished and until 1949 even no German state did exist. In the years after the 
founding of  the Federal Republic of  Germany (BRD), there were controversial 
discussions on whether the new state should also be allowed to re-arm. Among 
the occupying powers but also within German society the resistance against such 
plans was evident. In 1955, the German Bundeswehr was finally established. From 
the very beginning, the Bundeswehr was highly integrated in international orga-
nizations, first and foremost NATO, but also the UN and later on the EU. This 
exclusively multilateral orientation still shapes German defense policy today. When 
the Bundeswehr was founded, the underlying idea was that the army should not be 
able to gain a politically and socially dominant role as during the German Empire 
or be isolated from society like during the Third Reich and become a state within 
the state. Therefore, the head of  the military is the Defence Minister, a civilian 
who is part of  the government, which exemplifies the primacy of  politics. At the 
same time, the parliament has several important instruments of  control. Hence, 
the German Bundeswehr is a parliamentary army. First and foremost, the parlia-
ment has to approve every deployment of  the military abroad. Moreover, the 
parliament does decide about the budget of  the Bundeswehr.
In total, about 7000 German soldiers are currently deployed in ten out-of-area op-
erations, most of  them in Afghanistan (around 4100). All of  these operations are 
undertaken under the umbrella of  either NATO, the UN or the EU. Major Gen-
eral Müllner also touched upon the “comprehensive approach”—an approach that 
is advocated by the German government in the context of  military operations and 
that attempts to integrate various policy areas essential to the needs of  the host 
country’s population. In the following Q&A-session the participants where mainly 
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interested in Germany’s position regarding the intervention in Libya, the delivery 
of  tanks to Saudi-Arabia and the role of  Germany in security issues in the MENA 
region in general. In a heated debate, it became obvious that Germany is in a very 
special position when it comes to any security issue in the Middle East because of  
the historic responsibility towards the state of  Israel. This makes the Middle East 
a very sensitive topic in German foreign and security policy. The visit ended with 
a reception and a formal lunch where the participants had the chance to further 
discuss with Major General Müllner and several employees of  the ministry.
Visit to Infratest dimap—Jürgen Hofrichter: “Electoral and Political Research 
in Democratic Systems—Role, Methods, and Instruments”
On Friday (15 July 2011) afternoon, the Summer School visited the office of  In-
fratest dimap, a German electoral and political research institute. Jürgen Hof richter, 
Director for Election Research, introduced the work of  Infratest dimap and dis-
cussed with the students the role of  opinion and electoral research in a democracy. 
He explained that electoral and political research can fulfill three functions: firstly, 
it has a descriptive function, which means that it offers insights about the citizens 
of  a state. For this kind of  research, the same methods as for market research are 
used and the customers are mainly ministries and the like. Secondly, it has also a 
demoscopic function. Hence, it can reveal information about public opinion and 
thereby create news and provide information. Since this kind of  research is of  
high public interest, the main customers in this context are media companies. One 
specific characteristic feature of  this kind of  research is that the results can be 
measured against reality by posing the question: was the outcome of  the election 
similar to the predictions? And thirdly, electoral and political research can fulfill 
a strategic function, which means that they can also be used for classical political 
consultancy.
Mr Hofrichter illustrated the institute’s work by outlining the timetable for the next 
elections in Berlin. Before the elections, Infratest dimap will carry out six to eight 
pre-election surveys in which the public will be asked about their party prefer-
ences, the reasons for their choices, the popularity of  single politicians etc. On 
election day, the first prognosis will be published by Germany’s main TV stations 
at 6:00 pm sharp following the closing of  the polling stations. The prognosis will 
be based on a survey in which Infratest dimap asks voters right after leaving the 
polling station. The research institute will also analyze the reasons for the election 
outcome for instance by voter flow analyzes. According to Mr Hofrichter, the 
most important role of  opinion and electoral research in a democracy is to build 
a bridge between politics and the citizens. Infratest dimap is therefore surveying 
opinions but also ensuring transparency in the electoral process. Thereby, the most 
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important criteria for good research are high quality work methodologies, the 
employment of  well trained interviewees, as well as commitment to neutrality and 
transparency.
The Summer School participants where highly impressed by the work of  Infratest 
dimap and discussed the chances and obstacles for developing such an instrument 
in Egypt and Tunisa. In this context, Mr Hofrichter highlighted Infratest dimap’s 
international network and the possibility of  working together with institutes in 
other parts of  the world. At the same time, it became obvious that an independent 
institute such as Infrates dimap does not exist in Egypt or Tunisia, and that reach-
ing this high level of  sophistication might take many more years, whilst there was 
a consensus that political and electoral research are necessary instruments for any 
truly democratic system.
Visit to the Reichstag, Seat of the German Parliament
The weekend mainly consisted of  free time. Only on Sunday, a visit to the Reichs-
tag, the seat of  the German parliament, was part of  the Summer School program. 
During the guided tour, the students were introduced to the German political 
system, to the history of  the building as well as various modern art projects in the 
Reichstag. After the tour, the participants made their way up to the famous glass 
dome and enjoyed the magnificent view over the city.
The group on the Reichstag’s terrace
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Working Groups and Debates
During the Summer School, the participants convened in four working groups 
to each work on controversial questions related to the overall topic of  the Sum-
mer School. The working groups presented their findings in the form of  Oxford 
debates. Motivated by engaging in and eventually winning a debate, the working 
groups met repeatedly to prepare their argumentation and positions for the de-
bates. They were deliberately composed of  participants from diverse backgrounds 
and regions in order to stimulate the debate, to prevent the discussion from 
degenerating into stereotypes, and to provide the working groups with first-hand 
knowledge and insights from the respective regions.
Oxford-style debates are highly regulated in terms of  time limits, speaker positions 
and procedure. The discussants are divided into two groups: Proposition (Yes) and 
Opposition (No). The participants’ personal opinion is not decisive, since the dis-
cussants have to defend the position they were assigned to. In case of  the Summer 
School, each group comprised seven or eight members. In each debate, the first 
group spoke in favor of  the motion, the second group opposed it. The audience—
which had the opportunity to pose questions and comments in a Q&A-session—
consisted of  the two working groups not directly involved in the debate.
During several Working Group Sessions the participants prepared the debates
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The winner of  each debate was ascertained by the audience: before the debate 
started, the audience gave its opinion regarding the question through a secret vote. 
After the debate, the audience once again advanced its opinion on the given ques-
tion or motion. The audience was asked for an objective assessment of  the teams’ 
performance. For each person from the audience that has been convinced—that 
means for every change in opinion—the respective team received two points. For 
each assessment in favour of  the group one point was given.
On the first debating day, two motions have been addressed, “Neoliberalism fails 
to achieve social justice” and “Party officials of  former autocratic regimes should 
be barred from political life altogether.” On the second debating day, the four 
newly composed working groups competed in a small tournament. In the “semi-
finals,” group 1 and 2 debated about the question “Should the military in post-au-
thoritarian settings have constitutional authority to safeguard the values and prin-
ciples of  the state?,” group 3 and 4 about “Should the EU recognize the legitimate 
election of  political forces who do not subscribe to liberal, secular values?” The 
winner of  debate 1 then debated against the winner of  debate 2 about the motion 
“Only a secular state can be a democratic state.”
Pepijn from the Netherlands is bringing forward his arguments
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